In North America, professional sports leagues operate mostly as cartels. They employ certain policies such as revenue sharing, salary caps to ensure that teams get high revenues and players get high wages. There are two major hypotheses regarding the talent distribution among the teams that would maximize the total revenues, dominant teams rule and equal strength team rule. This paper examines the revenue structure of National Football League and proposes policy recommendations regarding talent distribution among the teams. By using a unique, rich data set on game day stadium attendance and TV ratings I am able to measure the total demand as a function of involved teams talent levels. Reduced form regression results indicates that TV viewers are more interested in close games, on the other hand stadium attendees are more interested in home teams dominance. In order to identify the true effects of possible policy experiments, I estimate the parameters of the demand for TV as functions of team talent , fixed team and market variables by using partial linear model described as in Yatchew (1998) which uses non-parametric and difference-based estimators. I then estimate the demand for stadium attendance using random coefficients model by using normative priors for the 32 cities that hosts the teams. Estimated demand for TV ratings and stadium attendance corroborates the findings of reduced form regressions, stadium demand and TV demand working against each other. We therefore propose a somewhat equal strength team policy where big market teams has a slight advantage over the others. Total revenues of the league is maximized under such a policy.
Introduction
Professional sports leagues in North America are good examples of cartels. Most of them have some sort of exemption status from the laws of commerce that the rest of the economy has to abide by.
They have a league governing body formed by the owners and players that plan and take care of the problems of the league. The league generates revenue through games and the revenue is shared between team owners and players. They are mostly free to adopt policies on governing the league as they wish. The league primarily wants to increase the total revenue made throughout the league in order to increase the salaries for players and profits for team owners. There are various actions available to the league including imposing a salary cap or revenue sharing.
There are two major hypotheses regarding how leagues use relative strength of teams to increase total revenues, player salaries and fan utility. The first is to follow the dominant teams rule. Pick a few teams that have revenue making advantage over the others and make sure that they have a stronger team ensuring that their fans will generate higher revenue. MLB, to some extent follows this, New York Yankees, Boston Red Sox, New York Mets and Chicago Cubs have clear advantage in revenue generation over the other teams. The second hypothesis is to distribute talent among the teams "evenly", ensuring a high level of competition and thereby attracting higher demand for the game.
In this paper we are going to empirically assess the superiority of these two hypotheses over each other for National Football League.
Among all professional sports leagues National Football League is by far the most lucrative sports league. In 2007, the NFLs annual revenues exceeded $7 billion. In contrast, Major League Baseball generated revenues of just over $6 billion. Basketball and hockey lag far behind. The National Basketball Associations annual revenues stand at $3.3 billion. Bringing up the rear among the Big Four team sports leagues, the National Hockey Leagues revenues reach $2 billion annually 1 .
There are clearly certain things going right with NFL. Popularity of the game has been increasing every passing year along with its' revenue making potential. Clearly their policies are working for the league. They have been employing a salary cap rule along with revenue sharing due to a collective bargaining with NFL Players Association.
This paper argues that in NFL, TV audience in general likes to watch somewhat close games while fans attending the games like to see their teams dominate the other team. On average 66-70 percent of a team's revenue comes from media deals. Since most of the revenue comes from the media it's best to have a policy that advocates a somewhat equal team strength.
There is a rich literature in sports economics. Most of the literature is in theoretical sports economics with a few empirical research papers mainly done in simple regressions. In the first mathematical model of a professional sports league, El-Hodiri and Quirk, (1971) , examine whether the current organization of professional team sports will lead to equalization of playing strengths.
They develop a dynamic model involving wages, revenues, trades, the draft, skill level, and the probability of winning a game. Profit maximization is not consistent with the equalization of playing strengths unless all teams are affected equally by a change in strength of one team in terms of gate receipts, or if the home team receives at least half of the gate receipts and all teams have the same revenue function. Additionally, to ensure equalization, there must be a constant supply of new playing skill and no cash sales. Equal strengths will converge regardless of the initial allocation of talent. Fewer teams and a quicker depreciation of talent will speed up the convergence process.
Atkinson, Stanley, and Tschirhart (1988), develop a model of a professional sports league which shows how revenue sharing encourages an optimal distribution of resources among teams. The league tries to devise an incentive scheme that will induce agents to maximize total output. The agents, on the other hand, receive private non-monetary benefits which are not shared. This leads to classical principal agent problem. Empirically, they show that that revenue sharing has desirable properties for the NFL, but is partially mitigated if teams are not profit maximizers.
Fort and Quirk, (1995), develop a profit maximizing model of a professional sports league.
They discuss the issues in determining the definition of winning, whether it be season-long winning percentage or championship prospect. The effects of the reserve system versus free agency are examined. A salary cap results in equal playing strengths and would be adopted if the cap is sufficiently low. They argue that it is the only incentive mechanism which can maintain league viability and competitive balance. In their analysis they find that closeness of the games matter by using winning records of opposing teams. They use various variables such as player race, coach race. However their analysis relies on local TV ratings which is a relatively minor consideration for the general discussion since most of the revenue comes from national media deals.
There is no research done on NFL for the entire revenue scheme. Our analysis is done for both TV ratings and stadium attendance making it possible for us to come up with a better policy analysis. TV ratings data we use is national level data and game day attendance data is a very rich panel data that spans 14 years.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the theoretical model. Section 3 introduces the data used in the paper. In Section 4, we use reduced form regressions and random coefficient models for both sets of data to estimate demand and discusses the results. Section 5 concludes.
Theory
This section first presents a simple theoretical model for sports demand both in terms of stadium attendance and TV ratings. Then I discuss some analytical results.
In general the audience cares about a game's potential characteristics such as how close the game will be, likelihood of their team winning the game, the week the game is played and other variables. We can represent the first two characteristics in terms of the talent levels of the teams.
Let t 1 be the home team's talent level and t 2 be the visiting team's talent level. Probability of home team winning has to be positively correlated with home team's talent level. Without loss of generality assume that
where 0 < α < 1. This assures us that probability of winning is an increasing and concave function of t 1 . Probability of winning for the visiting team is defined similarly Closeness of the game has to be correlated with the talent difference of the teams. Without loss of generality assume that
The TV ratings for a particular game will be the product of winning probability and closeness.
Similarly, stadium attendance will be a product of winning probability and closeness. Here, α is the elasticity of demand with respect to winning probability, β is the elasticity of demand with respect to closeness.
We assume that there are two types of cities, big cities and small cities. In an environment like this it's normal to assume that team types are also correlated with the city types. Teams in big cities should be able to bring more demand and more revenue. Therefore I am going to assume that big city teams will have t 1 talent and small city teams have t 2 talent. This model is equivalent to the model where there is one big city team and one small city team facing each other certain percentages of times in each other's stadium. Without loss of generality we can assume that they face each other ω 1 times at the big city team's turf, ω 2 times at the small city team's turf. We can assume that ω 1 + ω 2 = 1, moreover we will normalize the total talent to 1, t 1 + t 2 = 1. Even though total talent used by the league can be less than 1 we will assume that it will be binding. In other words, everyone in the talent pool will be employed.
2 Let the size of the big city be n 1 and the size of the small city be n 2 .
Under these assumptions total demand for stadium attendance will be
Since we are only looking national level TV data, for ratings can assume that elasticities of winning and closeness are same throughout the league. We have no way of seeing which city watched which game. Total demand for the game will be the sum of Att and Rating.
Proposition 2.1 Total demand is maximized when t 1 = t 2 if β i = 0 for at least one i = 1, 2, 3, 4.
Proof See appendix.
Clearly the degree of how much people care about close games is important. If they don't care at all, rather they care about their team winning then maximum demand is achieved depending on the relative elasticity of winning probabilities, relative size of the cities and ratio of the type of big cities and small cities. 
Here P oint i,t and P oint j,t are the number of points team i and team j will score at the game respectively.
Summary of the data is given in Table 1 in the appendix.
A single national ratings point represents one percent of the total number of television households. Since they are normalized with respect to the number of households with TV for that year it's a good measure for the TV demand for the game. There is quite a bit variation in the rating data to explain. The lowest rating we have is recorded on a game that coincided with a World lines show winning bias, we also include the absolute value of the betting lines, we only care how close a game is perceived to be not who is likely to win, absline measures this. By using absolute value of betting lines we introduce nonlinearity into our estimation, however at the same time we lose the directional information that betting lines bring into the table.
Stadium Data
Our stadium data covers the games between 1994-2007. I collected attendance data for every regular game using various web sites. I then collected betting lines corresponding to these games from Mrnfl.com. Mrnfl.com reports the betting lines published on Washington Post, therefore it matches the betting lines I used for TV ratings. Summary of the data is given in Table 2 Price is seasonal therefore has no effect on game by game estimation, stcost on the other hand is constant and in the usual reduced regression it has negative coefficient. Dif measures the difference between attendance and stadium size, difrat is the normalized difference ratio. I have to use difrat for censored regression model. Stadium size here is not a hard upper bound for attendance. It's most of the time adhered but in some cases some teams can add a few more seats to their stadiums. This is especially true for warm climate teams such as Tampa Bay. Nevertheless, the stadium sizes listed on team web sites are mostly observed, there are only 382 cases out of 3448 games that somehow teams managed to post attendance higher than their stadium size.
Estimation 4.1 TV Demand
The most important aspect of our TV Data is that we observe that games expected to be close bring higher ratings. Our hypothesis is that TV audience has a different utility function than the typical fan. In terms of the model we introduced, elasticity of winning probability for TV audience is very close to zero. Instead of going through the hassles of driving, waiting for the queues, bathrooms, parking, dealing with the rowdy fans they'd like to sit at the comfort of their house and watch a nice game. Average game watcher on TV is mostly interested in games that are competitive rather than his team definitely winning. Let (t 1 , t 2 ) be the talent level of both of the teams. Utility function of TV audience has to be a decreasing function of |t 1 − t 2 |, increasing function of win records of both teams. Utility maximization of TV audience problem gives us a plausible demand function.
It simply leads to the following assumption for TV ratings: I assume that the TV ratings is a production of betting lines , home team's win percentage, visiting team's win percentage and other market and game specific variables. This is along the lines of the theory I introduced in Section 2.
In order to account for the negative values that win-loss streaks and betting lines take I will use the following log-linear modeling:
where Ω = {homestreak, visstreak, homebase, visbase, totbase, dummyvariables} and i denotes the home team, j denotes visiting team. We do expect the coefficient for absline to be negative and coefficients of win percentages of both teams to be positive of close magnitude when we log-linearize the production function for ratings. In the log-linear model ln(y) = β 1 + β 2 x, one-unit increase in x leads to 100 × β 2 % change in y.
One of the problems with the estimation of TV ratings is that our data has sample selection issues 
The second equation is the selection equation. y 2 and x are always observed, y 1 is observed only when y 2 = 1. We have observations for Homewinper, Viswinper, Homestreak, Visstreak on every game. The fact that win-loss streak can be negative and we look at games where teams are more likely to be in equal strengths ensure that y 2 can be 0. For those games we don't have any ratings. With further assumptions that (u 1 , v 2 ) is independent of x with zero mean, v 2 ∼ Normal(0,1) and E(u 1 |v 2 ) = γ 1 v 2 we can estimate this model. A little bit manipulation gives us the following:
where λ is the inverse Mills ratio. We can estimate this model using the Heckit procedure:
We first obtain the probit estimateδ 2 from the model
using all observations. Then, obtain the estimated inverse Mills ratiosλ i2 = λ(x iδ2 ). Then, we obtainβ 1 andγ 1 from OLS regression on the selected sample, y i1 on x i1 ,λ i2 .
A simple t-test of the estimate of the inverse Mills ratio λ is a valid test for sample-selection bias.
Results of reduced form regressions and heckman probit selection model is shown in Table 3 -6.
Results are corroborating our hypothesis. TV audience cares more about how close the games are.
Clearly the negative coefficient on the absolute value of betting lines show that people care more about close games, it's statistically significant at the level of 10%. For every one unit difference in team talent ratings decrease by 6.7 percent. This is a significant effect on the ratings. Home team's winning percentage is favored a little more than the visiting team winning percentage. Even when corrected for selection we see that closeness of the games are significantly important.
Linear regression unfortunately gives us only a general idea about how the audience is reacting to games on TV. It averages out quite a bit of information and doesn't use the nonlinearity. If we look at Figure 1-3 , we see that ratings are very nonlinear in terms of betting lines, win percentages.
In order to account for nonlinearity in the model I use two other specifications to model the TV demand. The other specification for TV Ratings as a function of explanatory variables I use is
The other variables are in linear form. Nonlinear estimation of this specification is reported in Table 7 . Even when accounted for nonlinearity we see that absline has negative coefficient albeit it's statistical significance is not much. The power of absline,γ, comes out 1.655. This supports the linear regression model we estimated earlier. The coefficients and powers of win ratios are quite significant and again supports our results from linear regression.
Throughout all these models one other common result we see is that population base of a team is also very important. In other words teams that play in big cities or big markets tend to draw more audience to TV, this is of course expected but as a possible policy we can see that big market teams should have better teams in order to maximize the revenues. This is especially true for home teams that has a large audience. It's better to televise games that's played on a big city team turf.
The last specification I use is the semiparametric regression formulated by Yatchew:
where z is a random variable, x is a p-dimensional random variable. E[y|x, z] = f (z) + xβ and ǫ ijt is iid mean-zero error term such that V ar[y|x, z] = σ 2 ǫ . The function f is a smooth, single valued function with a bounded first derivative. In this model the parametric (xβ) and non-parametric (f (z)) parts are additively separable.
We follow the methodology suggested by Yatchew (1997) . We first estimate the nonparametric nonlinear part by locally weighted least squares method as described in Yatchew (2003) 
Thus, the direct effect f (z) of the nonparametric variable z and the indirect effect g(z) that occurs through x are removed. Suppose we apply the OLS estimator of β to the differenced data, that is,β
Then, substituting the approximations
into above and rearranging, we have
We can show that the above equation converges in distribution to N 0,
. Our estimator will be consistent.
Bottom line is, the estimation method we have here relies heavily on first differencing. After that we take the simple OLS estimator and then use kernel regression to get the nonparametric part. On the linear part we are using win ratios, streaks and other dummy variables. There is a clear correlation between betting lines and win ratios. This makes the assumption x = g(z) + ǫ possible. Moreover, differencing here is crucial because we difference the trends out from win ratios.
For the nonlinear part I use betting lines as explanatory variable. Results are reported in Table 8 .
The only difference here is that home team's win percentage has much more significance than the visiting team's win percentage.
On the other hand when we use the betting lines themselves for the nonparametric part and absolute value of betting lines in the linear part we get a much better picture. Using absolute value of betting lines in the linear part ensures us that positive trends from previous weeks are trended out. We can see this in Figure 1 . If we don't use absolute value of betting lines in the linear part, for regular games we get the Figure 2 . Figure 2 is a better indicator, it tells us that demand is maximized when betting lines are close to zero. However, the curvature around zero is not as high as in Figure 1 . Table 8 and table 9 shows the results. When we use absline in the linear part, we are getting a positive coefficient, this is due to the fact that most of the effect has gone onto nonparametric part that includes betting lines. The other results are similar with table 9, home team's win ratio is still more important than visiting team win ratio. Home team's population again is important.
The most important result from semiparametric estimation is that our hypothesis is supported again. TV audience is more interested in close games.
Stadium Attendance Demand
For the stadium case I am going to report linear fixed effect estimation results along with random effects tobit results for panel data in Table 10 and Table 11 . Results are pooled. In the following linear fixed effect model, x ijt includes absline, homwinrat, viswinrat, homstreak, visstreak and other dummy variables. One of the problems with using absline as explanatory variables here is that we lose quite a bit of information by doing that. We are losing the directional interpretation of betting lines, in other words which team is favored. If the coefficient of absline comes up as negative the interpretation is straightforward, fans like games that are close. If it comes up as positive interpretation is vague, it most probably means they like blow-out games but since absline doesn't tell us which team is favored we have to use other variables to come up with that result.
The first model is usual fixed effects panel data OLS estimation:
Attendance is limited by number of seats available to fans, therefore it's important take this censoring into account. As I pointed out in Section 3, censoring is not observed for every game.
For some games, some teams manage to post attendance more than stadium size, nevertheless this is not a big problem since I censor any attendance over the stadium size and use the stadium size as attendance for that particular game. A parsimonious model for the relationships between attendance and betting lines can be obtained by specifying a team-specific random intercept ζ 1j and a team-specific random slope ζ 2j for (x ij ):
We assume that the covariate x ij is exogenous with E(ζ 1j |x ij ) = 0, E(ζ 2j |x ij ) = 0, and
We will, as is usually done, assume that, given x ij , the random intercept and random slope have a bivariate normal distribution with zero mean and covariance matrix Σ. going dominant into a game.
Conclusion
The estimation results in Section 4 clearly shows that TV viewers and stadium attendees display different type of preferences for the game. TV ratings are determined mostly by close games with possibly strong teams playing each other. Figure 1 and 2 shows that maximum ratings are attained when lines are close to zero. Moreover, big city teams are drawing bigger audiences to their games.
Coupled with this fact, it's better to have as many close games and these games should be played among teams that has larger fan base. On the other hand stadium attendance is determined by home team's dominance. In a city, fans are much more likely to attend a game if they think their team is more likely to win. Therefore, it's better to give some bias in the distribution of talent to big city teams. Nevertheless, since most of the revenue is obtained through media deals we suggest that talent distribution among the teams should be more towards an even distribution. It's imperative that there should be some bias towards teams that have bigger fan base. Of course,
this is a policy that should be adopted if there is a sensible revenue sharing policy throughout the league. Here we are assuming that the NFL Commissioner acts as a Social Planner and has the means to redistribute the revenue generated by this cartel. With a policy of this sort, it's pretty easy to increase the size of the total revenue league makes and increase the individual teams' share.
Under this regime players on average are more likely to see their salaries go up as well since the total revenue made will increase considerably thereby increasing team owners' shares and players'
wages. If there is no redistribution of revenue in place then a policy that favors big city teams even a little bit is bound to backfire in the future since small city teams will get weaker considerably in time. Big city teams will likely use the revenues they make to attract better talent and get stronger as time progresses. This should have adverse effects on player salaries on average even though a few high talent players will likely see their wages go up much higher.
There is still more research to be done in this area. Once the demand parameters for TV Ratings and Stadium attendance are covered, it's pretty straightforward to do a policy analysis as to how the distribution should actually be done. Actual numerical experiments can be done to simulate the effects of any redistribution of talent. One should also observe that winning percentages are nonlinear functions of betting lines. Therefore this makes it easier to do analysis for TV Ratings.
On the other hand, for stadium attendance since we have recovered the random coefficients the policy analysis should be done to calculate the probability of fans attending a game depending on the betting lines. Unfortunately we do not have yet data on player salaries and player talent. The next step in this research will be correlating the player salaries to their talent level and coming up with profit function for the league so as to see the effects of a possibly policy like salary cap. 
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